Recently, deep networks have achieved impressive semantic segmentation performance, in particular thanks to their use of larger contextual information. In this paper, we show that the resulting networks are sensitive not only to global attacks, where perturbations affect the entire input image, but also to indirect local attacks where perturbations are confined to a small image region that does not overlap with the area that we aim to fool. To this end, we introduce several indirect attack strategies, including adaptive local attacks, aiming to find the best image location to perturb, and universal local attacks. Furthermore, we propose attack detection techniques both for the global image level and to obtain a pixel-wise localization of the fooled regions. Our results are unsettling: Because they exploit a larger context, more accurate semantic segmentation networks are more sensitive to indirect local attacks.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are highly expressive models and achieve state-of-the-art performance on many computer vision tasks. In particular, the powerful backbones originally developed for image recognition have now be recycled for semantic segmentation, via the development of fully convolutional networks (FCNs) [26] . The success of these initial FCNs, however, was impeded by their limited understanding of surrounding context. As such, recent techniques have focused on incorporating contextual information via dilated convolutions [43] , pooling operations [24, 46] , or attention mechanisms [47, 10] .
Despite this success, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. That is, small, dedicated perturbations to the input images can make a network produce virtually arbitrarily incorrect predictions. While this has been mostly studied in the context of image recognition [31, 21, 7, 30, 34] , a few recent works have nonetheless discussed such adversarial attacks for semantic segmentation [42, 2, 16] . These methods, however, remain limited to global perturbations to the entire image. Here, we argue that local attacks are more realistic, in that, in prac- (d) PSPNet [46] (e) PSANet [47] (f) DANet [10] Figure 1: Indirect Local Attacks. An adversarial input image (a) is attacked with an imperceptible noise in local regions, shown as red boxes, to fool the dynamic objects. Such indirect local attacks barely affects FCN [26] (c). By contrast, modern networks that leverage context to achieve higher accuracy, such as PSPNet [46] (d), PSANet [47] (e) and DANet [10] (f) are more strongly affected, even in regions far away from the perturbed area.
tice, they would allow one to modify the physical environment to fool a network. This, in some sense, was the task addressed in [9] , where stickers were placed on traffic poles so that an image recognition network would misclassify the corresponding traffic signs. In this scenario, however, the attack was directly performed on the targeted object.
Here, by contrast, we study the impact of indirect local attacks, where the perturbations are performed on regions outside the targeted objects. This, for instance, would allow one to place a sticker on the building such that the nearby dynamic objects, such as cars and pedestrians, gets mislabeled as the nearest background class. To this end, we first investigate the general idea of indirect attacks, where the perturbations can occur anywhere in the image except on the targeted objects. We then switch to the more realistic case of localized indirect attacks, and design a group sparsity-based strategy to confine the perturbed region to a small area outside of the targeted objects. In addition, we show the existence of a single universal fixed-size patch that can be learned from all training images to attack an entire unseen image in an untargeted way.
The conclusions of our experiments are disturbing: In short, more accurate semantic segmentation networks are more sensitive to indirect local attacks. This is illustrated by Figure 1 , where perturbing few patches in a static region has much larger impact on the dynamic objects for the context-aware PSPNet [46] , PSANet [47] and DANet [10] than for a simple FCN [26] . This, however, has to be expected, because the use of context, which improves segmentation accuracy, also increases the network's receptive field, thus allowing the perturbation to be propagated to more distant image regions. Motivated by this unsettling sensitivity of segmentation networks to indirect local attacks, we then turn our focus to adversarial attack detection. In contrast to the only two existing works that have tackled attack detection for semantic segmentation [41, 23] , we perform detection not only at the global image level, but locally at the pixel level. Specifically, we introduce an approach to localizing the regions whose predictions were affected by the attack, i.e., not the image regions that were perturbed. In an autonomous driving scenario, this would allow one to focus more directly on the potential dangers themselves, rather than on the image regions that caused them.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows. We introduce the idea of indirect local adversarial attacks for semantic segmentation networks. We design an adaptive, image-dependent local attack strategy. We show the existence of a universal, non image-independent adversarial patch for a given network and dataset. We study the impact of context on a network's sensitivity to our indirect local attacks. We introduce a method to detect indirect local attacks at both image level and pixel level. Our attack and detection code will be made publicly available upon acceptance of this paper.
Related Work
Context in Semantic Segmentation Networks. While context has been shown to improve the results of traditional semantic segmentation methods [15, 19, 20, 11] , the early deep fully-convolutonal semantic segmentation networks [26, 13] only gave each pixel a limited receptive field, thus encoding relatively local relationships. Since then, several solutions have been proposed to account for wider context. For example, UNet [38] uses contracting path to capture larger context followed by a expanding path to upsample the intermediate low-resolution representation back to the input resolution. ParseNet [24] relies on global pooling of the final convolutional features to aggregate context information. This idea was extended to using different pooling strides in PSPNet [46] , so as to encode different levels of context. In [43] , dilated convolutions were introduced to increase the size fo the receptive field. PSANet [47] is designed so that each local feature vector is connected to all the other ones in the feature map, thus learning contextual information adaptively. EncNet [45] captures context via a separate network branch that predicts the presence of the object categories in the scene without localizing them. DANet [10] uses a dual attention mechanism to attend to the most important spatial and channel locations in the final feature map. In particular, the DANet position attention module selectively aggregates the features at all positions using a weighted sum. In practice, all of these strategies to use larger contextual information have been shown to outperform simple FCNs on clean samples. Here, however, we show that this makes the resulting networks more vulnerable to indirect local adversarial attacks, even when the perturbed region covers less than 1% of the input image.
Adversarial Attacks on Semantic Segmentation: Adversarial attacks aim to perturb an input image with an imperceptible noise so as to make a DNN produce erroneous predictions. So far, the main focus of the adversarial attack literature has been image classification, for which diverse attack and defense strategies have been proposed [12, 4, 31, 21, 7, 30, 34] . In this context, it was shown that deep networks can be attacked even when one does not have access to the model weights [25, 33] , that attacks can be transferred across different networks [39] , and that universal perturbations that can be applied to any input image exist [28, 29, 36] .
Motivated by the observations made in the context of image classification, adversarial attacks were extended to semantic segmentation. In [2], the effectiveness of attack strategies designed for classification was studied for different segmentation networks. In [42] , a dense adversary generation attack was proposed, consisting of projecting the gradient in each iteration with minimal distortion. In [16], a universal perturbation was learnt using the whole image dataset. None of these works, however, impose any constraints on the location of the attack in the input image. As such, the entire image is perturbed, which, while effective when the attacker has access to the image itself, would not allow one to physically modify the scene so as to fool, e.g., autonomous vehicles.
This, in essence, was the task addressed in [9] , where it was shown that placing a small, well-engineered patch on a traffic sign was able to fool a classification network into making wrong decisions. Such attacks, however, are direct, in the sense that the perturbation is located on the object that should be misclassified. Here, by contrast, we study the impact of indirect local attacks, where the perturbation is outside the object of interest. This would allow one to modify static portions of the scene so as to, e.g., make dynamic objects disappear. We then study the impact of the contextual information exploited by different network architectures on robustness, and introduce an attack strategy that adaptively learns the minimal number of patches needed to misclassify the dynamic objects of interest. Note that patch-based attacks were used in the contemporary work [37] to attack optical flow models. Here, we study this for semantic segmentation, and introduce an approach to finding the best patch locations, instead of using manually-placed patches as in [37] . Furthermore, in contrast to [37] , we study indirect attacks that aim to preserve the correct labels within the attacked patch but fool other image regions, and propose detection strategies.
When it comes to detecting attacks to semantic segmentation networks, there exist only two techniques [41, 23] . In [41] , detection is achieved by checking the consistency of predictions obtained from overlapping image patches. In [23] , the attacked label map is passed through a pix2pix generator [17] to re-synthesize an image, which is then compared with the input image to detect the attack. In contrast to these works that need either multiple passes through the network or an auxiliary detector, we detect the attack by analyzing the internal subspaces of the segmentation network. To this end, inspired by the algorithm of [22] designed for image classification, we compute the Mahalanobis distance of the features to pre-trained class conditional distributions. In contrast to [41, 23] , which study only global image-level detection, we show that our approach is applicable at both the image and the pixel level, yielding the first study on localizing the regions fooled by the attack.
Indirect Local Segmentation Attacks
Let us now introduce our diverse strategies to attack a semantic segmentation network. In semantic segmentation, given a clean image X ∈ R W ×H×C , where W , H and C are the width, height, and number of channels, respectively, a network is trained to minimize a loss function of the form
where J is typically taken as the cross-entropy between the true label y true j and the predicted label f(X) j at spatial location j. In this context, an adversarial attack is carried out by optimizing for a perturbation that forces the network to output wrong labels for some (or all) of the pixels. Below, we denote by F ∈ {0, 1} W ×H the fooling mask such that F j = 1 if the j-th pixel location is targeted by the attacker to be misclassified and F j = 0 is the predicted label should be preserved. In the remainder of this section, we present our different local attack strategies, and finally introduce our attack detection technique.
Indirect Local Attacks
To study the sensitivity of segmentation networks, we propose to perform local perturbations, confined to predefined regions such as class-specific regions or patches, and to fool other regions than those perturbed. For example, in the context of automated driving, we may aim to perturb only the regions belonging to road in the input image to fool the car regions in the output label map. This would allow one to modify the physical, static scene while targetting dynamic objects.
Formally, given a clean image X ∈ R W ×H×C , we aim to find an additive perturbation δ ∈ R W ×H×C within a perturbation mask M that yields erroneous labels within the fooling mask F. To achieve this, we define the perturbation mask M ∈ {0, 1} W ×H such that M j = 1 if the j-th pixel location can be perturbed and M j = 0 otherwise.
Let y pred i be the label obtained from the clean image at pixel i. An untargeted attack can then be expressed as the solution to the optimization problem
which aims to minimize the probability of y pred j in the targeted regions while maximizing it in the rest of the image.
By contrast, for a targeted attack whose goal is to misclassify any pixel j in the fooling region to pre-defined label y t j , we write the optimization problem
We solve (2) and (3) using the efficient iterative projected gradient descent algorithm [3] with an p -norm perturbation budget M δ p < , where p ∈ {2, ∞}. Note that the formulations above allow one to achieve any local attack. To perform indirect local attacks, we can simply define the masks M and F in such a way that they do not intersect, i.e., M F = 0, where is element wise product operator.
Adaptive Attacks
The attacks described in Section 3.1 assume the availability of a fixed, predefined perturbation mask M. In practice, however, one might want to find the best location for an attack, as well as make the attack as local as possible. In this section, we introduce an approach to achieving this by enforcing structured sparsity on the perturbation mask.
To this end, we first re-write the previous attack scheme under an 2 budget as an optimization problem. Let J t (X, M, F, δ, f, y pred , y t ) denote the objective function of either (2) 
where λ 1 balances the influence of the term aiming to minimize the magnitude of the perturbation. To identify the best location for an attack together with confining the perturbations to as small an area as possible, we divide the initial perturbation mask M into T nonoverlapping patches. This can be achieved by defining T masks {M t ∈ R W ×H } such that, for any s, t, with s = t, M s M t = 0, and T t=1 M t = M. Our goal then becomes that of finding a perturbation that is non-zero in the smallest number of such masks. This can be achieved by modifying (4) as
whose first term encodes an l 2,1 group sparsity regularizer encouraging complete groups to go to zero. Such a regularizer has been commonly used in the sparse coding literature [44, 32] , and more recently in the context of deep networks for compression purposes [40, 1] . In our context, this regularizer encourages as many as possible of the {M t δ} to go to zero, and thus confines the perturbation to a small number of regions that most effectively fool the targeted area F. λ 2 balances the influence of this term with the other ones. We then quantify the sparsity of the resulting attack as the percentage of pixels that are perturbed.
Universal Local Attacks
The strategies discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are image-specific. To find a universal perturbation effective across all images, we write the optimization problem
where J u (·) is the objective function for a single image, N is the number of training images, X i is the i-th image with fooling mask F i , and the mask M is the global perturbation mask used for all images. In principle, M can be obtained by sampling patches over all possible image locations. However, we observed such a strategy to be unstable during learning. Hence, in our experiments, we confine ourselves to one or a few fixed patch positions. Note that, to give the attacker more flexibility, we take the universal attack defined in (6) to be an untargeted attack given in (2).
Adversarial Attack Detection
To understand the strength of the attacks discussed above, we introduce a detection method that can act either at the global image level or at the pixel level. The latter is particularly interesting in the case of indirect attacks, where the perturbation regions and the fooled regions are different. In this case, our goal is to localize the pixels that were fooled, which is more challenging that finding those that were perturbed, since their intensity values were not altered. To this end, we use a score based on the Mahalanobis distance defined on the intermediate feature representations. This is because, as discussed in [22, 27] in the context of image classification, the attacked samples can be better characterized in the representation space than in the output label space.
Specifically, we use a set of training images to compute class-conditional Gaussian distributions, with class-specific means µ c and covariance Σ shared across all C classes, from the features extracted at every intermediate layer of the network within locations corresponding to class label c. We then define a confidence score for each spatial location j in layer as
where X j denotes the feature vector at location j in layer . We handle the different spatial feature map sizes in different layers by resizing all of them to a fixed shape. We then concatenate the confidence scores in all layers at every spatial location and use the resulting L-dimensional vectors, with L being the number of layers, as input to a logistic regression classifier with weights {α }. We then train this classifier to predict whether a pixel was fooled or not. At test time, we compute the prediction for an image location j as α C(X j ). To perform detection at the global image level, we sum over the confidence scores of all spatial positions. That is, for layer , we compute an image-level score as C(X ) = j C(X j ). We then train another logistic regression classifier using these global confidence scores as input.
Experiments
In this section, we first explain our experimental setup and implementation details, and then analyze the vulnerability of state-of-the-art semantic segmentation networks to different types of attacks. Finally, we evaluate our imagelevel and pixel-level detection strategies. Datasets. In our experiments, we use the Cityscapes [5] and Pascal VOC [8] datasets, the two most popular semantic segmentation benchmarks. Specifically, for Cityscapes, we use the complete validation set, consisting of 500 images, for untargeted attacks, but use a subset of 150 images containing dynamic object instances of vehicle classes whose combined area covers at least 8% of the image for targeted attacks. This is to focus on fooling sufficiently large regions, because reporting results on too small dynamic objects may not be representative of the true behavior of our algorithms. For Pascal VOC, we use 250 randomly selected images from the validation set because of the limited resources we have access to relative to the large number of experiments we performed. Models. We use publicly-available state-of-the-art models, namely FCN [26], DRNet [43] , PSPNet [46] , PSANet [47] , DANet [10] on Cityscapes, and FCN [26] and PSANet [47] on PASCAL VOC. FCN, PSANet, PSPNet and DANet share the same ResNet [14] backbone network. We perform all experiments at the image resolution of 512 × 1024 for Cityscapes and 512 × 512 for PASCAL VOC. Since different models can have different normalization strategies for the input image, we include normalization in the network and pass the network an input image scaled to [0,1]. More details on the datasets and the models can be found in the supplementary material. Adversarial attacks. We use the iterative projected gradient descent (PGD) method with ∞ and 2 norm budgets, as described in Section 3. Following [2], we set the number of iterations for PGD to a maximum of 100, with an early termination criterion of 90% of attack success rate on the targeted objects. Given the dual objective of the loss functions in (2) and (3), it may happen that the gradients to maximize the confidence of labels at non-targeted locations dominate those at targeted ones. Hence, as suggested in [16], we ignore the loss at locations where the label is predicted correctly as the target label with a confidence of at least 0.3. We evaluate ∞ attacks with a step size α ∈ {1e-5, 1e-4, 1e-3, 5e-3}. For 2 attacks, we set α ∈ {8e-3, 4e-2, 8e-2}. We perform two types of attacks; targeted and untargeted. The untargeted attacks focus on fooling the network to move away from the predicted label. For the targeted attacks, we chose a safety-sensitive goal, and thus aim to fool the dynamic object regions to be misclassified as their (spatially) nearest background label. We do not use ground-truth information in any of the experiments but perform attacks based on the predicted labels only. We implement our algorithms in PyTorch [35] attacks, we report the ASR u , computed as the percentage of pixels that were assigned to a different class than their normal label prediction. Since, in most of our experiments, the fooling region is confined to local objects, we compute the above metrics only at the fooling mask regions. We observed that the non-targeted regions retain their prediction label more than 98% of the time, and hence we report the metrics at non-targeted regions in the supplementary material. To evaluate the detection of adversarial attacks, we report the Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (AUROC), both at image level, as in [41, 23] , and at pixel level.
Indirect Attacks
Let us study the sensitivity of the networks to indirect local attacks. In this setting, we first perform a targeted attack, formalized in (3), to fool the dynamic object areas by allowing the attacker to perturb any region belonging to the static object classes. This is achieved by setting the perturbation mask M to 1 at all the static class pixels and the fooling mask F to 1 at all the dynamic class pixels. We report the mIoU u and ASR t metrics in Table 1a and 1b on Cityscapes for ∞ and 2 attacks, respectively. As evidenced from the tables, FCN is more robust to such indirect attacks than the networks that leverage contextual information. In particular, PSANet and PSPNet are highly sensitive to these attacks.
To further understand the impact of indirect local attacks, we constrain the perturbation region to a subset of the static class regions. To do this in a systematic manner, we perturb the static class regions that are at least d pixels away from any dynamic object, and vary the value d. The results of this experiment using 2 and ∞ attacks are provided in Table 2 . Here, we chose a step size α = 0.005 for ∞ and α = 0.08 for 2 . Similar conclusions as in the previ- Table 2 : Impact of Local Attacks by perturbing pixels that are at least d pixels away from any dynamic class. We report mIoU u /ASR t for different values of d.
Figure 2: Indirect Local attack on different networks with perturbations at least d = 100 pixels away from any dynamic class.
ous non-local scenario can be drawn: Modern networks that use larger receptive fields are extremely vulnerable to such perturbations, even when they are far away from the targeted regions. By contrast, FCN is again more robust. For example, as shown in Figure 2 , while an adversarial attack occurring 100 pixels away from the nearest dynamic objects has a high success rate on the context-aware networks, the FCN predictions remain accurate.
Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks
We now study the impact of our approach to adaptively finding the most sensitive context region to fool the dynamic objects. To this end, we use the group sparsity based optimization given in (5) and find the minimal perturbation region to fool all dynamic objects to their nearest static label. Specifically, we achieve this in two steps. First, we divide the perturbation mask M corresponding to all static class pixels into uniform patches of size h × w, and find the most sensitive ones by solving (5) with a relatively large group sparsity weight λ 2 = 100.0. Second, we limit the perturbation region by selecting the n patches that have the largest values M t δ 2 ), choosing n so as to achieve a given sparsity level S ∈ {75%, 85%, 90%, 95%}. Specifically, S is computed as the percentage of perturbed pixels relative to the initial perturbation mask. We then re-optimize (5) with λ 2 = 0.0. In both steps, we set λ 1 = 0.01 and use the Adam optimizer [18] with a learning rate of 0.01 and a patch size h = 60, w = 120. We clip the perturbation values below Figure 3 for PSANet on Cityscapes. As shown in Table 3 , all context-aware networks are significantly affected by such perturbations, even when they are confined to small background regions. This means that, in the physical world, an attacker could add a small sticker at a static position to essentially make dynamic objects disappear from the network's view. For PASCAL VOC, we use the same hyperparameter values except for λ 2 , which is set to 10.0 in the first optimization step. Furthermore, we set the patch size to h = 60, w = 60. As shown in Figure 4 , we are able to find the most sensitive regions that cover a minimum area in the static class to fool the dynamic foreground objects. We report the effect of our adaptive indirect attacks on PSANet and FCN in Table 4 . For instance, at high sparsity level of 95%, PSANet has ASR t of 44% compared to 1% for FCN.
Universal Local Attacks
In this section, instead of considering image-dependent perturbations, we study the existence of universal local perturbations and their impact on semantic segmentation networks. In this setting, we perform untargeted local attacks by placing a fixed-size patch at a predetermined position. While the patch location can in principle be sampled at any location, we found learning its position to be unstable to due to the large number of possible patch locations in the entire dataset. Hence, here, we consider the scenario where the patch is located at the center of the image. We then learn a local perturbation that can fool the entire dataset of images for a given network by optimizing the objective given in (6). Specifically, the perturbation mask M is active only at the patch location and the fooling mask F at all image positions, i.e., at both static and dynamic classes. We learn the universal local perturbation using 100 images from Cityscapes and use the remaining 400 images for evaluation purpose. We use ∞ optimization with α = 0.001 for 200 epochs on the training set. We report the results of such universal patch attacks in Table 5 for different patch sizes. As shown in the table, PSANet and PSPNet are vulnerable to such universal attacks, even when only 2.3% of the image area is perturbed. From Figure 5 , we can see that the fooling region propagates to a large area far away from the perturbed one. We now turn to studying the effectiveness of the attack detection strategies described in Section 3.4. We also compare our approach to the only two detection techniques that have been proposed for semantic segmentation [41, 23] . The method in [41] uses the spatial consistency of the predictions obtained from K = 50 random overlapping patches of size 256 × 256. The one in [23] compares an image re-synthesized from the predicted labels with the input image. Both methods were designed to handle attacks that fools the entire label map, unlike our work where we aim to fool local regions. Furthermore, both methods perform detection at the image level, and thus, in contrast to ours, do not localize the fooled regions at the pixel level.
Attack Detection
We study detection in four perturbation settings: Global image perturbations (Global) to fool the entire image; Universal patch perturbations (UP) at a fixed location to fool the entire image; Full static (FS) class perturbations to fool the dynamic classes; Adaptive patch (AP) perturbations in the static class regions to fool the dynamic objects. As shown in Table 6 , while the state-of-the-art methods [41, 23] has high Global AUROC in the first setting where the entire image is targeted, our detection strategy outperforms them by a large margin in the other scenarios. We believe this to be due to the fact that, with local attacks, the statistics obtained by studying the consistency across local patches, as in [41] , are much closer to the clean image statistics. Similarly, the image re-synthesized by a pix2pix generator, as used in [23], will look much more similar to the input one in the presence of local attacks instead of global ones. For all the perturbation settings, we also report the mean percentage of pixels misclassified relative to the number of pixels in the image. We provide additional detection results with different perturbation settings and noise levels in the supplementary material.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the impact of indirect local image perturbations on the performance of modern semantic segmentation networks. We have observed that the state-of-the-art segmentation networks, such as PSANet and PSPNet, are more vulnerable to local perturbations because their use of context, which improves their accuracy on clean images, enables the perturbations to be propagated to distant image regions. As such, they can be attacked by perturbations that cover as little as 2.3% of the image area. We have then proposed a Mahalanobis distance-based detection strategy which has proven effective at imagelevel attack detection. While promising, its performance at localizing the fooled regions in a pixel-wise manner still leaves room for improvement, and addressing this will be our goal in the future. 
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Implementation Details
In this section, we provide detailed explanations about the experiments described in Section 4 of the main paper.
Models
All models for the experiments were implemented in PyTorch [35] FCN. We use the publicly released model 1 from the authors of [47] , which is trained together with PSANet [47] with an additional auxiliary loss. We use the ResNet-50 version for our evaluations.
PSPNet. We use trained model 1 released by the authors of [47] . It contains the same ResNet-50 as backbone network. The pyramid pooling module is a 4-level pyramid, which is concatenated to the final convolutional spatial map and later fed to a classification layer. 
DRN.
We use the trained model 3 released by authors of [43] . We choose ResNet-22 as backbone network with dilated version corresponding to type D.
U-Net. Along with the above-mentioned models, we evaluate the robustness of the U-Net architecture to local attacks. Due to the non-availability of a trained PyTorch [35] version of the U-Net model, we re-trained it ourselves, achieving 33.7% mIoU on Cityscapes.
Along with above six discussed models on Cityscapes, we experiment on PASCAL VOC [8] with trained models of FCN [26] 1 and PSANet [47] 1 provided by authors of [47] . The Cityscapes dataset has on average of 8% of the pixels corresponding to dynamic classes in each image. Since our study was targeted to mis-classify the dynamic objects, images with dynamic instances that occupy small regions might not be meaningful since such regions lie in the immediate receptive field of their surroundings. Therefore, we take a subset of images consisting of 150 images whose combined region of instances corresponding to vehicle classes ( car, truck, bus, train, motorcycle, bicycle) is greater than 8%. We provide the statistics of the resulting dataset in Table 7 .
While the original Cityscapes dataset was captured at 2048 × 1024 resolution, we resize the image to half resolution of 1024 × 512 as the original size is too large to fit into GPU memory. Furthermore, we crop the bottom region of the image corresponding to the ego-vehicle of height 62 pixels and resize the image back to 1024 × 512 pixels. For fair comparison, all models use the same 1024 × 512 resolution as input to the network without any tiling.
PASCAL VOC:
We use a subset of 250 images from the original validation set consisting of 1449 images. It contains 20 foreground classes and one background class. In all settings, we target the pixels corresponding to all 20 foreground classes by perturbing a subset of the background area.
Attack Algorithms
We solve the indirect attacks given in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the main paper using the efficient iterative projected gradient descent algorithm [3] with an p -norm perturbation budget M δ p < , where p ∈ {2, ∞}, using a step size α. In all our experiments, we set the maximum p -norm of perturbation as the product of the number of iterations given by 100 times α for ∞ attacks. For 2 attacks, we set the maximum 2 norm of perturbation to 100.
Formally, given an input image X, the adversarial attack minimizes the objective function, J t (X, M, F, δ, f, y pred , y t ) to find the optimal δ. We solve for δ in an iterative manner as
where Clip p ε clips the perturbation within the p ball of radius . For ∞ -norm based attacks, the gradient update is given by
where sgn is the signum function.
For 2 -norm based attacks, the gradient update is given by
We observe that the DAG attack [42] is similar to the PGD-2 attack. While DAG projects the gradient by r r ∞ , PGD-2 projects the gradient by r r 2 . We emphasize that our formalism for local indirect attacks is general and could be applied to other adversary generation techniques [42, 4] .
Attack Detection Algorithms
State-of-the-art methods. In this paper, we compare the spatial consistency [41] method and image re-synthesis method [23] for adversarial attack detection at image level. In [41] , given an input image of 1024 × 512 pixels, we crop 50 sufficiently overlapping pairs of patches of size 256 × 256 and compute the average mIoU of the overlapped patch regions as the confidence score for attack detection. In [23], we use the pix2pix generator to re-synthesize the image from the label map and then compute the 2 distance of the input image and the re synthesized one in HOG feature space.
Our method. We provide the implementation details of our attack detection based on the Mahalanobis distance. To this end, we compute the class-conditional mean µ c at every layer of the network within locations corresponding to class label c of the ground truth. Furthermore, we compute the group variance Σ for every layer of the network using features extracted at layer . Since the number of features extracted on the training set can be high, we propose to compute the mean and variance on averaged features within locations corresponding to each label.
Formally, let X j be the feature extracted at layer at position j for image X. Let the size of the feature map X be given as W × H × K where W , H , K are the width, height and number of channels for layer . Let L c ∈ R W ×H be the label mask activated at positions where the label is c, i.e., L c j = 1 if the j-th pixel location belongs to label c and L c j = 0 otherwise. First, we compute the averaged feature corresponding to label c given byX c = j|Lj =1 X j . We then learn µ c and Σ using {X c |X ∈ [X 0 , ..., X N ]} extracted from all N images in the training set. In the end, we obtain µ c ∈ R K and Σ ∈ R K ×K for a layer in the network which is used as confidence score of Eq.(7) of main paper.
We extract features at the end of every block in the ResNet backbone followed by a context layer and a classification layer. By doing so, we obtain a feature vector for the logistic detector of size L = 6 for FCN; L = 7 for PSANet; L = 7 for PSPNet; L = 5 for DANet; L = 5 for DRN. For evaluation purpose, we use 80% of the data for training and the remaining 20% for testing.
Performance Metrics
For evaluation, we use the following metrics to measure the effectiveness of our indirect local attack. Intersection over Union. We report the mIoU used in the domain of segmentation to evaluate the effectiveness of the attack. We report the mIoU at positions that we aim to fool (f ) since at the rest of positions, the label is retained almost 98% of times. For untargeted attacks, we report mIoU f u as the mIoU calculated between the normal image prediction and its counterpart adversarial image prediction at fooling positions. In the case of targeted attacks, along with mIoU f u , we report mIoU f t as the mIoU calculated between the normal image prediction and targeted label map at fooling positions.
Attack Success Rate. We report the attack success rate at the percentage of pixels mis-classified/preserved relative to the total number of pixels in the fooling/preserved positions, respectively. We report the mASR separately at two positions: 1) at positions that we aim to fool (f ); 2) at the remaining positions where the label should be preserved (p). We report mASR f u and mASR p u as the success rate calculated between the normal prediction and its adversarial image prediction at the fooling and preserved positions, respectively, for untargeted attacks. Specifically to calculate mASR f u , we assume the attack as being successful at a pixel if it mis-classifies it to any label other than the normal predicted label. In the case of targeted attacks, we additionally report mASR f t as the success rate calculated between the normal prediction and targeted label map at fooling positions.
Perceptibility. We take the ∞ -norm and 2 -norm of the perturbation image as the two perceptibility scores.
We average the above metrics over the entire test set. Since in almost all experiments the labels are retained almost > 98% times at preserved positions, we omitted reporting mASR p u in the main paper. We reported only mASR f t and mIoU f u at the fooling positions in the main paper as these metrics values are the most diverse in various attack settings.
AUROC. The area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) is computed by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) by varying a threshold. We compute the AUROC both at image level and pixel level and report them in all perturbation settings. Table 8 and 9 shows the performance of different networks by varying noise levels for ∞ and 2 attacks. Table 10 and 11 shows the impact of indirect attacks by perturbing static ones that are at-least distance d pixels from dynamic object class with ∞ and 2 attacks. Further, table 12 shows the complete performance statistics of different networks by tuning the sparsity levels in adaptive attack strategy. We then show the impact of universal single fixed size patch attacks in Table 13 by varying the patch size which is placed at the center of the image.
Cityscapes Experiments
Finally, we show the attack detection results with four perturbation settings: Global image perturbations (Global) to fool the entire image; Universal patch perturbations (UP) at a fixed location to fool the entire image; Full static (FS) class perturbations to fool the dynamic classes; Adaptive patch (AP) perturbations in the static class regions to fool the dynamic objects. Table 14 , 15, 16 and 17 shows the attack detection of our method and other two state-of-theart detection methods discussed in main paper with FCN, PSP, PSANet, DANet respectively.
Qualitative Results on Cityscapes
Figure 6 visualizes adversarial images obtained by varying the step size α in both ∞ and 2 for indirect local attacks with PSANet [47] . Figure 7 shows the outputs of indirect local attacks by perturbing static class pixels that are at least a distance d from a dynamic class pixel. Figure 8 shows the outputs of universal patch attacks on different networks by varying the patch area in {1%, 2.3%, 4%, 9%} of the image area. Figure 9 shows the results of adaptive local attacks on different networks by varying the sparsity level of the perturbation.
To understand the effectiveness of the Mahalanobis distance for attack detection, we visualize the internal subspaces of normal and adversarial samples. Figure 10 and 11 show the visualizations of the nearest cluster assignment for each spatial location in the top-4 layers for PSPNet [46] and PSANet [47] , respectively. Figure 12 the output of pixel-level adversarial attack detection using mahalanobis distance on PSANet [47] with adaptive indirect local attack at sparsity level 75%. Figure 13 shows the results of adaptive local attacks on PSANet [47] at Sparsity 95%. Table 13 : Universal Local Attacks on Cityscapes by tuning the patch size h×w (area%) on different networks. PSANet [47] and UNet [38] are highly sensitive to patch attacks even when the patch is 1% of image area. Note that the attack is untargeted and aimed to fool entire scene by placing a fixed size at the center of image. We use ∞ based attack with α = 0.001 and = 0.3. Figure 6: Indirect Attacks on Cityscapes to fool dynamic classes while perturbing complete static ones using 2 and ∞ attack. We use α = {8e-3, 4e-2, 8e-2} for 2 attacks and α={1e-5, 1e-4, 1e-3, 5e-3} for ∞ attacks. We observe that PGD [3] is efficient in computing an imperceptible perturbations for different ranges of step-size α. We observe that PSPNet [46] and PSANet [47] are most vulnerbale to adaptive indirect local attacks even with perturbations with high levels of sparsity while FCN [26] is least effected.
PASCAL VOC Experiments
Qualitative Results on PASCAL VOC
